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Abstract
In order to most effectively control wildlife at an airfield, airport managers must first identify and prioritize
the hazards posed by the different species present in their environment. A formula including ten primary
risk factors is presented in order to determine the relative threat posed by individual species or groups of
similar species. The ten primary risk factors are:
1) The overall population of the wildlife species (in total number of individuals)
2) The size (mass and surface area) of an individual animal within the species
3) The average number of animals encountered (i.e. average group size)
4) The amount of time spent in the airfield environment (migration, hibernation, etc.)
5) The time of day when the species is most active
6) The location of the species with respect to flight operations (AGL, distance from runways, etc.)
7) The time spent by the species in the air or actively moving
8) The number of reported strikes involving the species
9) The ability of the species to actively avoid aircraft collisions
10) The ability to actually influence the species through wildlife control
This assessment can be utilized to provide a list of wildlife species at an airfield that pose the greatest risk
to aviation and the order in which they should be addressed in a wildlife control program. This list can
then be used to prioritize wildlife control activities and serve as an index to help determine the overall
effort and money that should be spent on assuaging the strike hazard of any particular species. While
only a guideline, this formula can serve as an effective method of setting wildlife control priorities at an
airfield.

KEYWORDS: Risk Assessment, Priorities, Hazard Analysis, Wildlife Control, Bird strike Factors, Species,
Relative Threat
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Risk Analysis
In order to effectively control wildlife at an airfield, airport managers must first identify and prioritize the
hazards posed by the different species present in their environment. The model formula proposed allows
airport operators to carry out a professional risk assessment of wildlife on their airfield and develop a
wildlife control protocol for dealing with these risks in the most efficient and productive manner. It can be
used to evaluate all species at an airfield, so that a uniform, relative risk evaluation for the species can be
determined, and effective control measures developed to address those risks. This assessment can be
completed in order to provide a list of the species at an airfield that pose the greatest risk to aviation and
the order in which they should be addressed in a wildlife control program. Not all species are equally
hazardous to flight operations and the risk analysis should be completed with consideration of ten factors.
One must take into account a significant number of criteria when determining the order that the species
fall into and exactly how they might affect the overall operation of aircraft at any particular airfield. To this
end, airport managers should consider the following factors in establishing the priority of wildlife control
on their airfields:
1) The overall population of the wildlife species (in total number of individuals)
Population size may appear to be an obvious consideration when determining the overall threat to aircraft
operations posed by a particular wildlife species, however many times, airport managers do not conduct
accurate and quantifiable surveys in order to determine the absolute number of individuals involved.
Accurate determination of species presence becomes important in not only assessing the direct danger
posed by a particular species but also is critical in assisting airport managers in assigning relative risk
status to that species and prioritizing its control in their overall wildlife control program. Obviously, the
greater the number of individuals present in the environment, the greater the likelihood of striking an
aircraft. Higher numbers of animals do not always translate directly into a greater threat to aircraft, but it is
reasonable to assume the odds of striking one of 20,000 starlings is much greater than hitting one of two
great blue herons. Therefore, the species that have the highest number of individuals found within an
airfield’s environment are assigned higher risk factor in the relative risk hazard compilation.
Total numbers should be measured by valid survey count protocols, though purely empirical studies may
not be possible (or advisable) in light of the overall mission to protect aircraft operations. Population
counts conducted during routine wildlife patrols may be sufficient to gauge total numbers, as long as the
patrols cover the entire airfield environment and are carried out in a prescribed, systematic manner.
Oftentimes, without complete surveys, species numbers can be underrepresented in casual observations,
and hence, not addressed properly in the wildlife control program. Assumptions based on these types of
observations may result in an airport operator overlooking a serious risk factor. As an example, at an
Israeli Air Force base in northern Israel, the bird strike threat posed by birds was considered to be present
during daylight hours on or near the runways. It was assumed that most birds in the area did not fly at
night and therefore, bird control after dark was not afforded serious consideration at the airfield. However,
this was not the case, as thousands of birds sought refuge each night on the airfield habitat, coming in to
roost in the trees just before sunset and leaving early in the morning just prior to sunrise. Only after
routine evening patrols were established and direct surveys conducted was the concern actually
discovered (and later rectified).
2) The size (mass and surface area) of an individual animal within that species
Simplistically, the size of an individual animal striking an aircraft is proportional to its body size – directly
correlated to surface area - but more notably, it is generally correlated with the avoidance capabilities of a
particular species. Hence, a 6-oz. swallow has a much greater speed and movement capability than does
a 15-lb. Canada goose, thereby decreasing the risk of being struck by a passing plane. This factor is not
an absolute as there are some smaller, slow-moving animals and vice versa, but as a general rule of
thumb, the correlation holds true. Meadowlarks and curlews are examples of smaller-sized birds that are
highly inept at avoiding oncoming aircraft. Their patterns of flight, along with their inefficient flight
movements make them highly susceptible to being struck by an oncoming aircraft. Typically though,
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larger birds have a more difficult time in attaining flight momentum and need a wider turn radius, resulting
in a higher bird strike rate.
However, even more important to the overall equation is the fact the larger an animal’s body mass, the
more significant damage it could impart to an aircraft. In prioritizing the wildlife strike hazards on an
airfield, an animal’s mass plays a large part in the determination. The force of a bird striking an aircraft is
dependent on the velocity of the aircraft (the speed of the bird is generally much smaller) and the mass of
2
the bird. The equation e=1/2mv , where the resultant kinetic force imparted to the aircraft is one-half of
the mass of the bird times the velocity at impact squared, represents the potential damage that a bird can
inflict on an aircraft. There could be 200 separate bird strikes at an airfield involving single sparrows,
starlings, or larks but the damage that they are likely to inflict to a 747 is relatively insignificant. A single
bird strike involving a large Canada goose, on the other hand, could wreak havoc on even the largest of
planes, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars to repair and potentially risking the lives of the crew and
passengers onboard. Concentrating efforts on eliminating the presence of 50 swallows, for example,
scattered throughout an airfield may not be as important as focusing on removing a lone duck in a ditch.
3) The average number of animals encountered (i.e. average group size)
There are actually two sides to this variable, though in the majority of cases, those birds that travel in
flocks are potentially more of a hazard to aircraft operations than those that move about in small groups
or individually. Birds traveling in flocks are often confined in their overall movements to the vagaries of the
flock – where they flock goes, they follow. A bird traveling along within a large flock may not have the
spatial surroundings to actively avoid an oncoming plane. Reducing the freedom of escape paths and the
ability to maneuver in a crowd results in a higher risk potential to aircraft, as not every individual in a
group may be capable of avoiding a collision. Individuals within a flock are also not as vigilant and may
have slower reaction times due to the complacency of traveling in a large group. The old saying “There is
safety in numbers” may be true for protection against predators trying to single out an individual in a large
group but is not true for thwarting large aircraft on a collision course.
More importantly, the number of birds in a group can greatly affect the overall “size” of the strike. A
collision or ingestion of a large number of smaller birds may be equivalent to hitting a single larger bird –
as the mass of the birds is additive. Ingesting several
dozen starlings into an engine can be as damaging as
ingesting a much larger single duck. Because of the
flocking nature of birds and the fact that both birds and
airplane are traveling through space instead of
presenting stationary targets, some bird encounters
can involve more than 100 birds at a time. These types
of collisions can be as serious, if not more so, than
other types of bird strikes involving larger birds.
The other side to this is the fact that larger
conglomerations are easier to see and pilots may be
able to actively avoid them if they are capable of
detecting them at a distance. Flocks of birds are also
generally more predictable in their behavior patterns
and pilots may be able to plan their routes away from
the flocking birds.
4) The amount of time spent in the airfield environment (migration, hibernation, etc.)
The amount of time spent in the environment will also play a factor in determining overall risk to aircraft by
the species, as the more time the animal spends in the habitat, the higher the odds of it becoming
involved in a collision. A bird that passes through the area and may only be spotted near the airdrome
once obviously poses much less of a risk than one that spends all year in the local environment. The
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average number of days in the year that a species is present is a reasonable factor in analyzing to what
degree an animal will be in harm’s way.
5) The time of day when the species is most active
Related to the amount of time spent in the area is the role of the activity
levels and timing of the species, particularly since many airfield flight
regimens are based quite heavily on normal business of operating hours.
Birds that are most active during the heaviest times flight operations pose
a significantly higher risk of bird strikes than do those that are active
outside the regular flight time parameters. Obviously the day of the week
is not of consequence (weekdays vs. weekend days), as wildlife does not
distinguish between arbitrary daily designations. However, diurnal and
nocturnal behavior patterns are highly significant, as those birds and
wildlife that are active at night should not typically be exposed to as many
potential strike situations as those species that are primarily active during
the day. In order for a bird strike to occur, both bird and plane must not
only be in the same place as one another but they must also be there at
the same time. If either factor does not coincide, there will not be an
incident. Simplistically, a bird can cross a runway frequently without
posing a threat, as long as it does so when planes are not operating in that particular area of the
airdrome.
6) The location of the species with respect to flight operations (AGL, distance from
runways, etc.)
The location of the wildlife species is also critical in determining its potential threat to aircraft operations.
Those species that do not venture inside the aircraft operating area (AOA) or do not seek out locations
near active movement areas do not pose as much of a strike hazard as those that may forage on the
runways or in the drainage ditches alongside taxiways. Complicating this is the 3-D spatial component of
the movement of the species. Those species that may be located farther from the active parts of the AOA
but fly at great heights may pose more of a threat than a species that spends its time within the AOA but
does not fly very far off the ground. Snow geese, for example, travel at much greater heights than do
plovers. Even though a snow goose may rarely spend time on a particular airfield and a plover may spend
an excessive amount of time within the confines of the AOA, the snow goose can actually pose a much
greater threat since it flies at heights that coincide with aircraft flying altitudes and the plover may not fly
more than several feet off the ground. Thus the odds of striking a plover are only significant when a plane
is on landing or takeoff and even if a significant number of plovers are present on an airfield, if they are
located well away from the runways and rarely spend time near movement areas, their hazard scores can
be minimal. The score for snow geese in this factor can be much higher since they fly at considerable
heights that may cross both approach and takeoff glidepaths, as well as “go arounds”, low level
approaches, or any general flight below several thousand feet.
Even approach and takeoff patterns of aircraft can be a factor in formulating the degree of risk posed by a
particular species. Determining that a particular species of birds is normally located “x” meters from the
active runway may not be an equivalent risk to another species that is equidistant from the runway but in
a very different portion of the airdrome. If a particular population of birds is located in a very specific
sector of the airfield (along a river bordering the airfield, for example), flight operations for that particular
airfield may dictate that the risk assessment would actually be minimized or exaggerated. A bird located
100 meters off to the side of a runway poses a very different threat than one situated 100 meters off the
approach end of the same runway. This positional effect is particularly true for military airdromes where
fighter aircraft operate, as takeoffs for fighters are normally quite precipitous. If prevailing winds routinely
prescribe a specific takeoff direction, the presence of a bird species at either the takeoff or approach end
of the runway may make a significant difference in the threat to the aircraft.
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7) The time spent by the species in the air or actively moving
An additional factor that must be weighed in the
determination of hazard scores is the time spent in the air
by the bird species (or actively moving about the airfield
in the case of wildlife hazards). Those species of birds
that spend a great deal of their time foraging on the
ground or rarely change locations do not pose as great of
a threat as those species that move about the airfield
frequently. If an individual animal doesn’t move, it isn’t
likely to be hit. Again, in order for a bird strike to take
place, both bird and plane must share the same airspace
at the same moment in time. Since at the majority of
airfields, planes spend little time moving about on the
ground at high speeds and any incident involving a
taxiing aircraft is most likely inconsequential (birds can also readily avoid slow-moving planes on the
ground), the more time a bird spends in the air, the more likely its path will cross that of an aircraft.
8) The number of reported strikes involving the species
History is also a great predictor of future occurrences. Ideally it would immensely useful to evaluate prior
bird strikes over the course of several years at an individual airfield. Knowing what bird or wildlife species
have caused greater numbers of strikes at the airfield environment is generally quite predictive of futures
problems, assuming conditions and/or control methods have not radically changed. Oftentimes however,
an airport manager does not have a detailed and extensive data collection of reported strikes at their
disposal and so they must rely upon figures provided by the FAA or a similar entity. In the FAA’s National
Wildlife Strike Database, rankings of the numbers of strikes have been compiled and are shown below.
Not all species may be represented in each airfield’s environment so those species should obviously be
eliminated from the final hazard formulations, but overall, the database provides a relative strike risk for
general categories of species.
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Strike Rate Data (Based on data from FAA National Wildlife Strike Database, 1/91 – 5/98)
Species Group

Strikes
Reported

% with
Damage

% with Major
Damage

% with Effect on
Flight

Gulls
Blackbirds/Starlings
Sparrows
Geese
Hawks
Ducks
Deer
Rock Dove
Herons
Swallows
Shorebirds
Owls
Vultures
Crows/Ravens
Mourning Dove
American Kestrel
Coyote
Cranes
Eagles
Osprey
Pelicans

2599
1052
622
532
452
401
367
346
215
209
196
171
152
149
139
138
49
28
24
18
17

20
6
2
56
25
41
87
20
20
1
11
17
67
11
16
11
13
56
38
50
53

8
2
<1
21
7
13
46
11
6
<1
2
7
24
4
9
9
3
20
5
18
13

18
10
6
32
21
23
77
20
20
3
11
10
40
11
10
10
26
25
23
36
27

9) The ability of the species to actively avoid aircraft collisions
Not all birds are created equal and not all species are equally capable of actively avoiding a collision with
an oncoming aircraft or staying out of the way of aircraft movement areas altogether. Crows, for example,
are quite adept at avoiding aircraft, as are northern harriers, American kestrels, and ravens. Others, like
storks, curlews, and geese are notoriously unskilled at avoiding impacts with faster aircraft (though with
geese, it can depend on their location and flight status). Those species that are able to actively avoid
oncoming aircraft do not warrant high hazard scores and thereby do not justify as much attention as other
species.
10) The ability to actually influence the species through wildlife control
Though all efforts can be placed upon clearing the airdrome of each and every bird, not all species
respond to the forms of harassment used in a wildlife control program. Some birds respond to
harassment by vacating the area and returning on the rare occasion or not at all. Others are more difficult
to exorcise and continue to return (or do not leave the AOA at all) when harassed (irrespective of the
method of control used). Since many airport managers do not employ lethal means to remove animals
from the airfield, they are held to utilizing the various forms of harassment at their disposal. Geese, for
example, respond very well to the presence of a Border Collie and vacate the area promptly. Red-winged
blackbirds on the other hand may leave for short periods but return the next day or sometimes, hours
later. Swallows and swifts respond very little to any form of harassment and rarely even shift to another
area of the airfield after being harassed.

Final Formulation
A risk assessment rating system is applied to each species in order to determine a risk "value". In order to
determine this risk value, each of the above risk factors should be evaluated for each species (or group of
similar species – all species of “ducks” for example, may be able to be consolidated into one category
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and treated as a single unit) and ranked proportionately on a scale from 1 to 100 (100 percent being the
most significant threat for that factor present on the airdrome – all other species are expressed as a
percentage of the highest risk species). Inversely proportional scores should be used for the final two
factors (ability to avoid collisions and ability to control the species) since these risks are inversely related
to the other risk factors (e.g the ability to control a species is inversely related to its ultimate risk to aircraft
operations). The resultant scores for a species should then be multiplied together to derive a final risk
score (“R”).
The formula that describes this relationship is as follows;
R =log x
where x = Overall Population Size x Mass of Individual x Group Size x Time on Airfield x Time of Day x
Location x Degree of Movement x Strike History x Avoidance Ability (inv.) x Ability to Control (inv.)
Below is a typical tabulation for one species at an airfield (results will vary for each airfield habitat, even
for identical species).
Species
Group

Pop

Size

Group

Time
Spent

Time
Of Day

Location

Movement

Strikes

Avoid
(inv)

Control
(inv)

Canada
Geese

90

30

100

100

100

100

100

21

90

100

18

The final risk score in this example would be (log 5.103 ), or 18.71. The scores for all species are
tabulated in this manner and ranked accordingly. Categorizing these final risk values (as high, moderate ,
or low, for example) is useful, but the most practical application of the risk values is their relative
significance to one another. Because each person conducting this assessment will evaluate the factors in
a slightly different manner and assign risk variables based on their own experience and perceptions, the
risk values can vary from person to person. Therefore, the most useful application of the analysis is the
relative relationship of risk values for each species on the airfield environment. It is helpful to assign the
species with the highest overall risk ranking in the final tabulation a value of 100 percent and all other
species as a proportional risk of that value. A “relative hazard percentage” is based on a percentage
scale, starting with the highest priority species at 100 percent and working downward (hence, a species
with a score of 52 percent of the score of the top-ranked species is 52 percent as much of a risk as that
species).
Once the risk values have been determined in this manner for all species identified, there will be a
prioritized range of values. This allows an airport manager to develop a wildlife control program that can
deal with all significant risks, but with an emphasis on those species that are rated highest. Ultimately,
this can serve as an index to help determine the overall effort and money that should be spent on control
of each species in the wildlife control program.
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A Case Study – Dover Air Force Base
The following chart is the resulting ranking based on the hazard scores from the species (or group of
species) on or near Dover AFB in Dover, Delaware. The two scores, the overall ranking and the relative
hazard percentage, are compilations of all of the above described risk factors.

Species Group

Overall Risk Ranking

Canada Geese
Snow Geese
Seagulls (all species)
Ducks (all species)
Vultures
Flocking Birds *
Raptors
Egrets/Herons
Crows
Songbirds
Shorebirds
Kestrels
Owls
Swallows
Groundhogs
Deer
Foxes
Rabbits

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Relative Hazard
Percentage
100
94
8
6
5
4
1
1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1

* Flocking birds consists of species such as red-winged blackbirds, starlings, grackles, etc.
The primary reason for conducting a risk assessment and prioritization in this manner is the possibility of
discovering risks (or lack thereof) that may not be readily apparent in general field observations or that
may be counterintuitive to existing wildlife control protocol. Concentration on particular populations of
birds may be ultimately more productive than generalized control of all species on the airdrome. Similarly,
it may behoove airport managers to focus their control efforts on the usage of specific forms of
harassment or habitat management, in order to most effectively utilize their staff or resources. Analysis of
this type may also help managers in determining whether or not to purchase or implement particular
control procedures or methodologies (such as the institution of a long-grass policy or purchase of trained
Border Collies) on their airfields.
As an example, a few interesting items that were discovered from the summary data at Dover AFB:
1) Overall, the geese (Canada geese and snow geese) comprise roughly 97 percent of the serious
strike threat to the C-5 fleet at Dover AFB. Control of these individuals should be the highest
priority and their complete exclusion from the airfield and patrol zones should be the key mission
in the wildlife control program. The usage of Border Collies is the critical feature of Dover’s
program that reduces this hazard.
2) Seagulls and ducks represent the next highest threats, though their scores are less than 2
percent of the overall threat posed by the geese (though they are 8 and 6 percent respectively of
the threat posed by the top-ranking risk species, Canada geese). This means that roughly 2
percent of the focus of the wildlife program should be on excluding these individuals from the
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area. Ducks are particularly responsive to the Border Collies and the seagulls are highly
responsive to both the dogs and remote-control airplanes (RPVs).
3) Vultures are a minimal but justifiable concern at Dover AFB. The factor that ulimately brings their
hazard score down is the ability to control them. Though RPVs are effective in removing the
immediate threat of the vultures from the vicinity of the airfield, they return in the same numbers
the next day and do not seem to be influenced in the long-term. The threat of the RPVs most
likely is seen as an annoyance, not as a predator. The vultures’ return the next day signals this
fact. Since the Border Collies are unable to be used effectively against the vultures (unless they
are loafing or feeding on the ground), ultimate predatory deterrent cannot take place and the
effect on the birds is only transitory. However, attempts to exclude vultures at almost all other
airfields have met with dismal success and in comparison to other methods, the temporary relief
afforded by the RPVs is outstanding.
4) Though deer are a large and dangerous animal, they
appear to pose minimal threat to Dover’s fleet. This is
primarily due to the fact that there are few deer on
the base itself and those that are within the perimeter
do not venture from the woods located well away
from the aircraft movement area. Since they remain
in place, they stay out of harm’s way and are not a
significant concern for the overall wildlife
management program.
5) All other animals and birds do not pose a sizeable
strike threat to Dover’s fleet. Songbirds, for example,
may be struck regularly but do very little damage and
concentrating efforts on reducing their numbers
through active measures (like with use of dogs,
pyrotechnics, or RPVs) is inefficient because it takes
away efforts from the more critical species
(particularly geese). Passive measures, like habitat management and long grass policies are
certainly helpful in reducing this strike potential but exorbitant amounts of money should not be
spent to help alleviate the problem.

Summary
A risk assessment rating system is applied to each species at an airfield in order to determine a risk
“rating”. This list should be used to prioritize wildlife control efforts and can be used as an index to help
determine the overall effort and money that should be spent on assuaging the strike hazard of the
particular species. While only a guideline, this formula can serve as an effective method of setting wildlife
control priorities and may, in the long run, help airport operators improve the facilitation of wildlife control
on their airfield.
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